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Hungary’s economic relationship with the European Union is one that may be 
characterized by asymmetrical interdependence. Recent events in Hungary suggest an advance of 
illiberal governance practices in Hungary, which would contradict with stated EU interests in 
promoting liberal democracy and rule of law. This paper seeks to provide some explanation 
regarding why economic sanctions from the EU may not be enough threat to deter Hungary from 
exhibiting behavior that directly violates fundamental EU values and principles, even given its 
economic dependence on the EU. This will be done through an evaluation of EU capacity to 
impose sanctions on its member states, the competency of economic sanctions in addressing 
illiberal regimes, and Orbán’s potential reasons for an illiberal turn. In the final section, the paper 
analyses EU approaches to economic sanctions policy and comments on the steps taken so far 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 The European Union (EU) stands today as a body that seeks to represent and promote 
liberal democracy, rule of law, and increased competitiveness in the global market for its 
constituent member states. Recent events that have transpired within the EU indicate an erosion 
of the values on which its identity is founded. Arguably, the most severe case of this democratic 
backsliding has been Hungary under the governance of Victor Orbán and his party, FIDESZ. The 
emergence and development of the current situation in Hungary, as well as the ensuing responses 
across and from the EU, have illuminated weaknesses in European institutions while raising the 
question of how the EU may move forward in order to address them.  
 Having evolved from the European Coal and Steel Community, an organization created 
after the Second World War to mediate trade and thereby reduce capacity for war within 
signatory states, the EU is, at its conception, founded on interests of regional security through 
economic integration. It has grown to encompass political norms and social values, and has 
demonstrated considerable influence in promoting its interests. As the goals of the EU broaden, 
so does the potential area for them to be opposed. It would be ideal, from the perspective of the 
EU, to maintain the upholding of all its interests equally and simultaneously. However, it may 
not be realistic to hope that it is possible for this to be the case.  
 Many indicators point toward an advance of illiberal governance practices in Hungary 
since Orbán became Prime Minister in 2010, with authors assigning terms from “nascent 
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autocracy”1 to “mafia state,”2 and Orbán himself declaring Hungary an “illiberal democracy.”3 It 
can be debated the extent to which this is the case, but even more compelling questions are how 
and why a democratic backsliding may be occurring. Hungary’s economic relationship with the 
EU is one that can be characterized by asymmetrical interdependence- that is, Hungary is 
significantly more economically dependent on the EU than vice versa. In 2017, intra-EU exports 
accounted for 82% of total Hungarian goods exports,4 with an average annual growth rate of 
6.8% between 2003 and 2017 and a 25% increase from 2010 to 2017. On the other hand, 
Hungarian goods contributed only a 2.4% share of the total intra-EU export market in 2017. In 
2016, Hungary received €4.55 billion in EU funding, whereas Hungary’s contribution to the EU 
budget in the same year was €924 million.5 Loans provided to Hungary through the European 
Investment Bank amounted to €891 million in 2018;6 for reference, total Hungarian GDP for 
2018 was reported at $303 billion.7  It is evident that Hungary is dependent on the EU for its 
trade market, and reaps significant economic benefits from the EU in terms of investment and 
                                                      
1 R. Daniel Kelemen, “Europe’s Other Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in Europe’s Democratic 
Union,” Government and Opposition 52, no. 2 (2017): 211–238, https://doi.org/doi:10.1017/gov.2016.41, 212. 
2 Bálint Magyar, Post-Communist Mafia State : The Case of Hungary (Budapest, Hungary: Central European 
University Press, 2016). 
3 Dimitry Kochenov and Laurent Pech, “Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: Rhetoric and 
Reality,” European Constitutional Law Review 11, no. 3 (December 2015): 512–40, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1574019615000358, 518. 
4 Eurostat, “Intra-EU_trade_in_goods_update_september_2018,” 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=Intra-EU_trade_in_goods_-_recent_trends#Intra-EU_trade_in_goods_by_Member_State. 
5 European Parliament, “EU Budget Explained: Expenditure and Contribution by Member State,” 2017, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+IM-
PRESS+20141202IFG82334+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
6 Kester Eddy, “EIB Financing for Hungary at Record EUR 891 Mln in 2018,” Budapest Business Journal, March 
31, 2019, https://bbj.hu/special-report/eib-financing-for-hungary-at-record-eur-891-bln-in-2018_162824. 
7 OECD, “Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Indicator),” n.d., https://doi.org/10.1787/dc2f7aec-en. 
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funding. The questions that emerge from these conditions are how and why Hungary may be able 
to undertake recurring, ongoing, and arguably systemic violations of EU norms.  
 Given the asymmetrical economic interdependence between Hungary and the EU, 
Hungary has a lot more to lose than the EU does if the EU were to cut off, in part or in full, 
economic ties between the two. In this scenario, one may intuitively expect Hungary to comply 
with the norms and values of the EU. Liberal democracy and rule of law are among the basic 
tenets on which EU identity is predicated today. For Hungary to exhibit signs of democratic 
backsliding and dismantling of checks and balances at the national level goes directly against the 
obvious logic. I will undertake an explanation of this scenario in the following sections of my 
paper, focusing on the potential capacity that the EU has for leveraging its economic strength to 
effect democratic and rule of law norm compliance in Hungary. When considering economic 
influence, there may be both ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks.’ ‘Carrots’ could include an increased potential 
for benefits through trade, investments, and funding. Conversely, ‘sticks’ may be the 
introduction of certain barriers to trade, discouraging investments, and reducing funding. Given 
that there is already a high level of trade integration and direct economic flows between the EU 
and Hungary, I will focus on the latter strategies- policy options often discussed as economic 
sanctions.  
The remainder of my paper will be structured as follows: first, I will discuss the 
institutional dynamics of the EU’s capacity to impose economic sanctions on its member states. 
Second, I will consider the potential for economic sanctions to successfully democratize the 
states that they target. Third, I will look at the situation in Hungary, exploring the reasons for its 
government’s illiberal turn and evaluating how effective sanctions may be based on the 
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preceding section. Fourth, I draw on the previous three sections to assess the policy steps that the 




























CHAPTER 2: EU CAPACITY 
Introduction 
 The extent of EU power and influence has been a matter of debate throughout the years 
due to its alleged shortcomings in terms of mechanisms, like military intervention, through 
which to actively assert its preferences. Despite critics, the EU has demonstrated that it does 
possess weight on the global stage. Soft power of the EU should not be underestimated in its 
ability to influence international politics through processes of socialization and learning, which 
may come as a result of interacting with and observing the benefits of the EU model. Liberal 
intergovernmentalists like Andrew Moravcsik go so far as to argue that Europe is the world’s 
“second superpower,” and that, contrary to the claim of select American presidents, the United 
States that has been free-riding on European power.8 EU ‘hard power’ is rooted largely in its 
robust internal market. In 2016, it was the second largest global market in terms of nominal 
GDP, the second largest exporter and importer of goods, and first largest importer and exporter 
of services in the world. Furthermore, EU member states were collectively the largest destination 
and source of international foreign direct investment (FDI) flows.9 As demonstrated in the 
introduction, EU economic influence in Hungary is no exception to the global economic 
                                                      
8 Sophie Meunier and Milada Anna Vachudova, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Illiberalism and the Potential 
Superpower of the European Union,” Journal of Common Market Studies 56, no. 7 (2018): 1631–47, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12793, 1633. 
9 Meunier and Vachudova, 1635. 
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dependence on cooperation with European markets. Whether or not the EU is able to mobilize 
this dependence in way that allows it to influence other policy areas, however, is another matter.  
Background on EU Political Conditionality 
 Rational perspectives on EU diplomacy point toward the impact that asymmetrical 
relationships may have on the cost-benefit analysis of key actors. Asymmetrical interdependence 
between member states can result in member state implementation of policies that comply with 
EU rule of law even when incompatible with their existing agenda, because the potential 
negative impact of EU retaliatory action for noncompliance would be greater than the costs 
associated with carrying out compliant policies. The EU effected the most change in Hungary 
and the rest of Central Eastern Europe (CEE) during the period leading up to their accession into 
the Union. During this time, the incentive for action was the ‘golden carrot’ of EU membership, 
with acquisition of the reward being conditional on meeting policy compliance with EU norms. 
EU actors were able to influence political change at the state level by leveraging political 
conditionality. However, even the many benefits associated with EU membership were not 
enough to create the change asked for by the EU in all CEE states.10 When national identity 
and/or the existing agenda of state governments and/or its key decision makers did not align with 
EU demands, the three key factors identified in whether or not change would occur were 1) size 
and speed of the reward, 2) the size of domestic adoption costs, and 3) the credibility of 
conditionality.11 Whether through negative or positive incentives, in influencing change it is 
                                                      
10 Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Political Safeguards against Democratic Backsliding in the EU: The Limits of Material 
Sanctions and the Scope of Social Pressure,” Journal of European Public Policy 24, no. 3 (2017): 337–51, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1229358, 342. 
11 Frank Schimmelfennig, “European Regional Organizations, Political Conditionality, and Democratic 
Transformation in Eastern Europe,” East European Politics and Societies: And Cultur 21, no. 1 (February 1, 2007): 
126–41, https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325406297131, 127. 
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crucial that the application of said incentives are not only sufficiently significant and viable, but 
also credible. 
 Similar logic may be applied when considering the potential impact of EU economic 
sanctions on Hungary. In considering the threat of economic sanctions’ ability to redirect the 
democratic backsliding occurring in Hungary, one must evaluate the size and speed of the 
hypothetical sanctions, the costs that Hungary would incur in order to avoid sanctions, and the 
credibility that the sanctions will come into (and out of) force. Although economic sanctions are 
not as large an incentive as EU membership,12 the magnitude of asymmetrical economic 
interdependence between Hungary and the EU render it a policy instrument that should not be 
underestimated. In this section analyzing institutional dynamics around EU ability to apply 
sanctions, the discussion centers on the credibility of the threat of sanctions. Given Orbán’s 
recent actions and expressed interests, it is unlikely that democratic backsliding Hungary will 
change course to realign with EU liberal democratic norms without external influence. Operating 
on the assumption13 that economic sanctions are an incentive for change, they will not be 
effective unless it is sufficiently believable that 1) they will be applied if Hungary continues 
illiberal governing practices, 2) that they will not be applied if Hungary re-converges with EU 
norms on democracy and rule of law, and 3) that, if applied, they will be lifted when (and only 
when) the desired EU changes occur.  
 
 
                                                      
12 Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Is Europeanisation through Conditionality Sustainable? Lock-in of Institutional Change after 
EU Accession,” West European Politics 35, no. 1 (2012): 20–38, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.631311, 
21. 
13 The accuracy of this assumption will be further explored in later sections of this paper. 
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EU Mechanisms for Enacting Domestic Sanctions and Addressing Rule of Law 
 Institutionally, it is extremely difficult for the EU to trigger economic sanctions on a 
member state. There has only been one case of material sanctions between member states; intra-
EU economic sanctions occurred in 2000 against Austria over what has been known as the 
‘Haider affair.’ This case however, was not of the EU against a member state, but rather 
bilaterally negotiated sanctions between Austria and the other member states at that time.14 The 
EU has changed dramatically in the almost two decades since then, and as such one may say that 
there exists no precedent, to date, of the EU imposing economic sanctions on a member state. 
Two mechanisms that currently exist through which the EU may potentially sanction member 
states can be found in Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, along with 258 and 260 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  
Article 7 gives the European Council authority to sanction any member state guilty of a 
“serious and persistent” breach of the EU values as defined in Article 2 of the TEU, which 
includes principles on democracy and rule of law.15 This article has never been used, and its 
potential to be called into effect is extremely limited due to its demanding necessary procedural 
requirements. For Article 7 to be used, there must first be a formal determination of a risk for 
serious breach of Article 2, followed by the determination of an existing and persisting serious 
breach, after which the power to trigger Article 7 goes to the hands of the European Council. In 
order to determine a risk for serious breach, there must be 1) a proposal by the European 
                                                      
14 R. Daniel Kelemen and Michael Blauberger, “Introducing the Debate: European Union Safeguards against 
Member States’ Democratic Backsliding,” Journal of European Public Policy 24, no. 3 (2017): 317–20, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1229356, 318. 
15 European Commission, “A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law” (Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, March 19, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-
justice/files/com_2014_158_en.pdf. 
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Parliament (EP) or Commission from one-third of member states, 2) the consent of the EP, and 
3) a four-fifths majority of the Council of the EU. To determine an existing, persisting serious 
breach, the same conditions must apply, and then any action taken must be done so unanimously 
by the European Council (with the unapplied abstention of the party in question.)16 Moreover, 
even once these procedural requirements have been met, the European Council is under no legal 
obligation to take any action.  
 The thresholds for triggering economic sanctions through Article 7 are so high that its 
occurrence is generally written off as virtually impossible. In the current case regarding Orbán’s 
Hungary, it is almost certainly impossible. The current Polish government has openly spoken out 
in support of the Orbán regime, and has directly promised to vote against the imposition of 
sanctions on Hungary. This is already enough to block the use of Article 7 at the stage where 
unanimity among heads of state is required. Additionally, Orbán’s FIDESZ party is allied with 
the European People’s Party (EPP) in the European Parliament. The EPP is currently the largest 
party in the EP in terms of the number of seats, and furthermore there are key EU actors who are 
affiliated with the other EPP parties. There have been several cases where motions to make cases 
against the rule of law violations in Hungary have been blocked by EPP votes, and even more 
cases where EPP-interested heads of state and/or heads of EU bodies have neglected to take 
action even when the EP succeeded in passing resolutions that recommend taking action on 
Hungary.  
 In an effort to expand the EU toolbox for addressing rule of law violations in its member 
states, the Rule of Law Framework was established in March of 2014. Before the Rule of Law 
Framework, the EU lacked even a clear definition of ‘rule of law.’ This Framework improved the 
                                                      
16 Kochenov and Pech, “Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality,” 516-7. 
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EU capacity to respond to rule of law violations in its member states, but partisan politics and 
interests have continued to limit its practical uses. In June 2015 and again in December 2015, the 
EP managed to pass resolutions calling on the European Commission to launch the Rule of Law 
Framework. These resolutions were able to pass even despite the EPP overwhelmingly voting 
against them. In both instances, the European Commission refused to launch the procedure 
(which would not have imposed material consequences, but would have acknowledged the 
existence of rule of law concerns in Hungary) against the Orbán government. Although one may 
only speculate, partisan politics may have influenced the Commission’s decision to ignore the 
EP’s decisions. At the time, the Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and the majority of 
commissioners were EPP members. The seats contributed to the EPP by FIDESZ were critical in 
maintaining an EPP-dominated EP, and it is likely that the EPP-led Commission was interested 
in preserving this power across EU executive bodies.17 Between national alliances of illiberal 
regimes blocking the unanimity vote at the European Council level and partisan politics 
influencing action at the EP and Commission level, the notoriously high-barrier Article 7 
procedure appears to be completely inoperable.  
 There is one more executive body of the EU that has yet to be discussed, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). The ECJ is the judicial branch of the EU, and has the potential ability to 
impose financial sanctions on member states through Articles 258 and 260 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).18 Through Article 258, the European Commission 
has the ability to bring member states before the ECJ if they fail to comply with EU obligations 
and Commission recommendations. If the member state in question fails to comply with ECJ 
                                                      
17 Kelemen, “Europe’s Other Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in Europe’s Democratic Union,” 226.  
18 Kochenov and Pech, “Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality,” 517. 
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judgements resulting from article 258, Article 260 allows that the state be brought before the 
Court once more, and gives the ECJ additional power to impose financial sanctions on the 
member state in question.19 However, the potential of impact of sanctions through this 
mechanism are also not promising. Bringing a member state to trial through these mechanisms is 
subject to political considerations like the partisan affiliations impeding use of Article 7. 
Furthermore, ECJ decisions reflect whether or not the actions of those on trial violate EU law. 
Regarding fundamental values like rule of law and democracy, EU treaties lack clear legal 
criteria, and case-by-case judgements on specific rule of law violations have limited effects on 
systemic dismantling of democratic institutions.20  
Even when the ECJ has made rulings reflecting legal violations in Orbán’s Hungary, the 
performance history for creating meaningful results has been poor. When the Hungarian 
government implemented a mandatory early retirement policy in 2011 to remove certain judges 
from their positions, the ECJ judged the actions in violation of maintaining an independent 
judiciary. In response to losing the case, Hungary reviewed its legislation but did not reinstate 
the judges that were affected by the initial policy changes.21 In this case, despite legal 
proceedings at the EU level, the end result was still a Hungarian national court where existing 
judges were replaced with FIDESZ party loyalists.  
 Overall, the EU’s capacity to trigger infringement procedures that would allow the 
imposition of sanctions of a member state that is exhibiting behaviors in violation with EU 
                                                      
19 Kochenov and Pech, 517. 
20 Michael Blauberger and R. Daniel Kelemen, “Can Courts Rescue National Democracy? Judicial Safeguards 
against Democratic Backsliding in the EU,” Journal of European Public Policy 24, no. 3 (2017): 321–36, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1229357, 322. 
21 Kochenov and Pech, “Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality,” 518. 
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values is extremely limited. The EU is a dynamic and ever involving body, and there exists the 
possibility that the EU toolbox for addressing illiberal states may expand over time. However, 
EU institutions’ power depend on the extent that its constituent member states pool their 
governing sovereignty at the supranational European level.22 Negotiations at the EU level are 
notoriously unwieldy and slow, and one may expect that these traits be possibly further 
exacerbated when attempting to form mechanisms that would impose consequences on actions 
currently being observed in an existing EU member state(s).23 The time sensitive nature of 
addressing democratic backsliding in EU member states indicates that exclusive reliance on the 
evolution of EU institutions may not be effective. The proposals for innovative application of 
existing legal frameworks have been criticized for their potential politicization of judicial 
bodies.24 While avoiding a fatalistic evaluation of potential EU action in the face of democratic 
backsliding in its member states, the prospects for intra-EU use of sanctions through existing 
institutions appears limited. If this is the case, then the threat of sanctions as negative incentive 




                                                      
22 The mechanisms through which these institutions are built, and sovereignty pooled, is subject of an extensive 
debate. This statement is not meant to imply that member state actors are/are not the principal force in the building 
of European institutions. Rather, it reflects on the identification that the EU consists of member states that retain a 
level of governing sovereignty over themselves, and that there exist divisions between the governing jurisdictions of 
the EU and member state governments over citizens of EU member states.  
23 A detailed analysis establishing the causal links for the building of European institutions are outside the scope of 
this paper. This statement, nor any forthcoming, is not meant to provide a hierarchy of factors nor to discount factors 
not explicitly mentioned.  
24 Blauberger and Kelemen, “Can Courts Rescue National Democracy? Judicial Safeguards against Democratic 







CHAPTER 3: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS’ CAPACITY TO DEMOCRATIZE 
Introduction  
Economic sanctions have been heavily criticized as a policy tool for their ethically 
questionable potential humanitarian impacts on target societies, politically controversial 
intervention in sovereign nations, and, overwhelmingly, extremely dubious track record in 
achieving their goals. Historically, economic sanctions have such a poor success rate that authors 
now question whether the primary motivation for their employment in recent cases are the same 
as the goals stated in their reasons for use. Since the outbreak of the first World War, there have 
been a total of 187 sanctions episodes; 46% of these cases in the 1914-2000 period (86 cases) 
were enacted with the goal of promoting democratization. Of these, it has been asserted that 57 
episodes (66%) saw sanctions lifted even though the goal had not been achieved. Only 12 of 
these 57 cases were judged “partly successful,” 8 were still ongoing in 2000, and in 37 cases 
(65%) sanctions were lifted without regime change or democratization even partly 
accomplished.25  The question of why the EU may consider using economic sanctions to promote 
liberal democracy despite the policy tool’s poor credentials will be discussed in the policy 
section of this paper. In the following section, I will evaluate some of the reasons that past 
sanctions have failed to achieve their goals, and point out some of the conditions that sanctions 
theorists have identified for potentially increasing the success of economic sanctions regimes that 
may be adopted in the future.  
                                                      
25 Manuel Oechslin, “Targeting Autocrats: Economic Sanctions and Regime Change,” European Journal of Political 
Economy 36 (2014): 24–40, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.07.003, 24-5. 
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Modern Theories Regarding Economic Sanctions 
 The liberal concept of material sanctions stems from the intuitive logic that economic 
incentives will create pressure in the target state(s) to change in line with the sender states’ 
desired political outcomes. However, this simplistic reasoning underestimates the complexity of 
sociopolitical structures within nations, especially the motivating factors of illiberal governments 
and the capacity of citizens living under these regimes to put pressure on those in power. Those 
harmed the most by sanctions are often the least capable of producing change. Among the key 
principles of illiberal regimes are barriers to political participation and restricted ability for 
citizens to act against the regime. Civilians already suffering under an illiberal regime are 
unlikely to have enough of a political voice to result in regime change, and increasing their 
suffering will only increase the potential short-term losses that they may incur from opposing the 
existing regime. Although an increase in the population’s suffering should mean greater 
incentive to revolt against their government, Manuel Oechslin’s 2014 economic analysis of 
material sanctions and regime change identified that the increase in the cost of a revolt tends to 
outweigh the rise in benefit.26 Instantaneous utility is concave, which is to say that the immediate 
losses that citizens would bear as a result of revolt (even a successful one) are proportionally 
larger than the longer run benefits that they may be able to achieve through revolt. In nations 
with illiberal governments that are willing and able to divert the costs of sanctions to their 
constituent populations, economic sanctions may reduce the capacity of citizens to apply 
pressure on their government.  
In reaction to a range of high-profile cases failed to produce the desired results largely 
discredited the liberal concept of economic sanctions, an inverted liberal idea emerged that 
                                                      
26 Oechslin, 34. 
 15 
described populations of target countries as only vulnerable victims of potential sanctions 
policies. However, this is also flawed logic because citizens are not completely void of agency. 
Especially in cases of hybrid regimes like Hungary, which exhibit some authoritarian tendencies 
but are still at least partly accountable to their societies, governments must maintain some level 
of societal support. Although coercive dynamics can be observed in these regimes’ durability, 
they are also sustained on legitimacy. However, in order for economic sanctions to have potential 
impact on the structure of these governments, it is important to consider which actors will 
affected, and furthermore which actors have the ability to effect state-level democratic change. 
Institutional theories of economic sanctions have identified that the institutional setup of regimes 
impact the way that the resultant costs of sanctions are distributed across society. Public choice 
theorists have identified that state policies are a result of interactions between domestic groups, 
and that sanctions impact these groups unevenly. Neo-Weberian theorists contend that states are 
not neutral arenas for domestic interests; state structures offer uneven opportunities for political 
representation and favor some interests over others.27 Gramscian theories expand on this by 
arguing that state institutions and resources are shaped by their societies and that state power is a 
dynamic, fundamentally social relation.28 Constructivist theories of international relations 
recognize that  neither state nor individual interests/behavior are autonomous of one another; 
state-society ideologies are mutually constitutive. The potential impact of economic sanctions 
vary greatly depending on the regimes that they target, and result from a complex, historically 
contextual yet ever evolving constellation of institutional structure and power relations.  
                                                      
27 Lee Jones, Societies Under Siege: Exploring How International Economic Sanctions (Do Not) Work (Oxford 
Scholarship Online, 2015), 26-8. 
28 Jones, 36, 39. 
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Economic Sanctions for Democratizing Illiberal States 
One key rational issue with economic sanctions as a policy tool to democratize target 
countries is the difficulty in tempering the relationship between economic pressure and regime 
change. Drawing on the earlier discussion regarding efficacy of incentives to incite political 
change, the size of incentives must be appropriately attractive relative to the size of adoption 
costs. Quantifying the size of economic cost that could be reasonably be expected to bring about 
regime change raises many problems. There are two options for change: first, that the existing 
party abandons their illiberal practices in favor of liberal democracy; second, that the existing 
government is replaced by a democratic coalition. Especially if the government in place relies on 
illiberal practices to stay in power, what amount of domestic economic pain should be large 
enough to result in change? Even if we take out of account the material costs necessary to 
restructure state institutions, the political costs for existing policy-making elites to democratize is 
extremely large. Additionally, economic sanctions are most successful when they are able to 
directly target very specific policy areas, like sender-state trade sanctions on raw materials 
necessary for weapons production to influence weapons exports in target states. Linking 
economic sanctions to democracy, on the other hand, is extremely unwieldy. It would be a 
fallacy to make the general assumption that capitalist actors place socio-politically liberal 
principles over economic interests. Regarding sanctions in Iraq, a Dutch businessman has been 
quoted remarking “I really don’t care if Hitler or Saddam rules Iraq. I have a clear task: to 
maximise my company’s business…I am only answerable to my CEO and the shareholders.”29 
To be sure, this quote represents an extreme and doesn’t speak for all capitalist actors,30 but the 
                                                      
29 Jones, 43. 
30 Also, shareholder and consumer interests may reflect preference for liberal democratic principles. 
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point is clear: economic interests and values associated with liberal democracy do not necessarily 
go hand-in-hand. With the extremely vague goal of democratization, associated economic 
sanctions have been likened to a neutron bomb: destroying the economy and wreaking misery on 
the general population while leaving the political establishment intact.31 When the link between 
incentive and targeted change is ambiguous, policy results are uncertain.  
The solution to the ‘neutron bomb’ problem would be to impose targeted economic 
sanctions that exclusively punish those responsible for the illiberal governance practices. This is, 
predictably, tricky. Illiberal states with the institutional capacity to divert economic costs are less 
likely to respond to material sanctions. In many illiberal regimes, one motivating factor of state 
actors is their ability to capture economic rents for their personal gain. The survival of these 
regimes is often reliant on their ability to deliver payoffs among its supporters. In these cases, 
political support may decrease if sanctions are able to sufficiently limit the resources available 
for the distribution of patronage. However, if the losses of resources from economic sanctions 
are able to be replaced through other revenues, the costs, and thereby, pressures generated by 
sanctions are redirected. One attribute of illiberal regimes that may impede effective targeting is 
identified by institutionalist literature. State institutions mediate the ability of key actors to 
domestically distribute the costs that arise as a result of economic sanctions. In this way, the 
potential success of economic sanctions is conditioned by the strength of domestic institutions 
for shifting the streams of fiscal pressure. If targeted parties are able to redirect the economic 
losses generated by sanctions to the general population through, say, increased taxes, then the 
                                                      
31 Franklin L. Lavin, “Asphyxiation or Oxygen? The Sanctions Dilemma,” Foreign Policy 104 (1996): 138–53, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1148995, 146. 
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pressure generated by economic sanctions is shifted as well.32 This makes the reality of targeting 
economic sanctions to effect democratization, at a minimum, difficult.  
While domestic cost diversion can impede the success of economic sanctions on illiberal 
governments, shifting external revenue streams may also pose an issue. Given the case that 
potential economic partners globally is greater than one, unilateral economic sanctions face the 
problem that target governments may find external revenues elsewhere. If targets of economic 
sanctions are able to cooperate with states other than the sanction-sender(s), they may offset a 
portion of the economic losses from sanctions with support from alternative markets.33 Because 
of this, economic sanctions are less likely to succeed in target states that have the option for 
cooperation with alternative revenue sources than those that do not. The solution to this would be 
multilateral sanctions where sanction-senders include every possible major external revenue 
source. However, especially when the goal and thereby ‘rallying cry’ of sanctions is 
democratization, the likelihood that this solution may be achieved appears limited. It is possible 
that a sender state may convince other states to join their sanctions regime against a single sender 
state, but the sender should be cautious regarding the coercive mechanism through which this is 
achieved. Secondary sanctions, or sanctions threatened on third parties to compel them to join a 
sanctions effort, have been extremely ill-received by not only their targets but also supranational 
bodies like the World Trade Organization.34  
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A final consideration that may negatively impact economic sanctions’ success in 
producing liberal democracies that I will highlight here is the potential for illiberal leaders in 
target states to leverage sanctions policies in their domestic messaging and cues. In illiberal 
regimes that employ nationalist rhetoric to increase support, external intervention like sanctions 
can have a ‘rally-round-the-flag effect’35 that actually increases domestic support for their state 
government. Economic sanctions may also allow target governments place blame on sender 
states for hardships that voters experience, regardless of the actual source or reality of these 
hardships.36 In the Zimbabwean case, personnel of the ruling party have been quoted privately 
stating that the lifting of sanctions would be the worst thing that could happen because of their 
usefulness as a scapegoat for the country’s economic crisis.37 Insofar as ideas and preferences of 
domestic publics are shaped by state messaging, economic sanctions may provide illiberal 
leaders a focal point on which to mobilize citizens against the desired goals of senders. 
Economic sanctions are a highly criticized policy tool due to their poor record of success 
in cases where they have been employed, and further theoretical skepticism regarding their 
potential for success in future cases. When the goal of economic sanctions is to promote liberal 
democracy in illiberal regimes, both the expected and observed rate of success are even lower. In 
certain scenarios, economic sanctions may have the perverse effect of strengthening nationalist, 
authoritarian governments. It would be ludicrous to argue that governing parties seek to be the 
target of sanctions regimes, but several authors have made the fair point regarding the self-
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selection bias of analyzing cases of sanctions: that, in cases where sanctions are likely to 































CHAPTER 4: DEMOCRACY, HUNGARY, AND THE EU 
Introduction 
 Although intuitive logic based on Hungary’s economic dependence on the EU makes the 
recent turn away from EU norms on liberal democracy and rule of law seem unexpected, the 
general emergence of an illiberal government within the EU should not be shocking. The EU 
today stands to represent humanitarian and liberal principles, but ultimately is not a development 
agency. From the perspective of collective action theory, the EU has been cited as a body that is 
primarily about coordinating “coalitions of the willing.”38 Even its enlargement to include the 
states of CEE, which has been regarded one of the most successful democracy promotion 
programs implemented by an international actor, the initial goal was not to export democracy, 
but rather to import existing stable democracies.39 As such, the ideological homogeneity of states 
that exist as EU members has been taken for granted. Given this, EU treaties have not developed 
an extensive toolbox for maintaining and enforcing convergence on norms like liberal democracy 
and rule of law within its own constituent states. Moreover, the emergence of illiberal 
governance within the EU is not an entirely unique situation. Cases have been documented 
wherein state-level pockets of authoritarianism exist in bodies that are democratic at the federal 
level.40  
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Democratization in the EU 
 The EU began as an economic union and continues to exist as a union where economic 
interests hold fair primacy. This is reflected in its acquis communautaire of rules that govern EU 
member states. In order for states to join the EU, they must meet requirements outlined in the 
Copenhagen Criteria that include principles like liberal democracy, as well as integrate the 
acquis into their domestic legislation. The relevance of the Copenhagen Criteria exists only as 
necessary terms for becoming an EU member, whereas the acquis is legally binding for all 
member states even after accession into the Union. Although the intention of the Copenhagen 
Criteria is that they should ensure candidate states’ commitment to EU norms and values, the 
EU’s diligence in ensuring that this was the case has been criticized. Satisfaction of the criteria 
was determined with a policy ‘checklist’ that leaves room for oversight on potentially informal 
aspects of democracy and rule of law.41 This is in line with the EU’s general focus on 
maintaining homogeneity in the economic and financial policies that are critical for the 
functioning of its internal market. Although state development during the golden age of the 
Washington Consensus, which coincided with the period leading up to Hungary’s accession to 
the EU, had a tendency to bundle neoliberal economic policies with general Western political 
ideas of democracy, the legitimacy of these assumptions has been questioned heavily in more 
recent years. Literature on liberalization and business systems theory point to potential fallacies 
in assuming that the strengthening of market liberalization is necessarily accompanied by liberal 
political practices. In particular, general perceptions on the success of ‘liberalization’ tends to 
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overestimate the malleability of state institutions.42 Additionally, economic reforms’ emphasis 
on creating ‘winners’ of reform who maintain the reform processes fails to constrain the capacity 
of these actors to become rent-seeking elites that ultimately damage overall liberalization.43 EU 
emphasis on economic reform and the way it takes for granted ideological convergence in its 
accession of CEE states makes the emergence of illiberalism today not entirely shocking.  
Illiberal Governance within Democratic Regions 
 It has been established that sub-federal pockets of soft authoritarianism existing within 
larger federal bodies is not unusual. Let it be clear that it is not my intention in making this 
comparison to make a statement on the extent of democratic backsliding that is occurring in 
Hungary, nor to assert that the level of supranational authority held by the EU is on par with 
federal governance. Rather, there are ideas that may be drawn and parallels that may be 
identified between the current EU-Hungary economic relationship and the ideas discussed in the 
literature regarding sub-federal autocracies. First, in Gervasoni’s 2010 conclusions from models 
based on the case in Argentina, the public standing of the federal president has no effect on the 
level of democracy in a state controlled by an opponent, and that additionally, in states whose 
governors are affiliated with the president’s party, capacity to restrict democracy strengthens as 
presidential approval grows.44 This is relevant to the independent polls in Hungary reflecting 
consistently high public opinion of the EU and EU institutions alongside their majority trust in 
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the FIDESZ government. It is perhaps counterintuitive that public opinion of seemingly 
ideologically opposed governing bodies polls highly in both, but case analysis shows that one 
should not necessarily expect that high public trust in the EU be mutually exclusive with support 
of a Euroskeptic state leader. Second, Gervasoni identified a correlation between rentier 
situations and high levels of asymmetry between federal fiscal transfers and state taxation levels. 
His hypothesis is that states with higher per-adult fiscal transfers from the federal government 
are associated will lower levels of democracy.45 This is especially true in cases with 1) high 
vertical imbalances, that federal transfers are significantly larger than state tax revenues, 2) 
federal redistribution in favor of economically smaller units, especially where there are large 
differences in the economic sizes of subfederal units, and 3) federal funds are transferred with no 
strings attached.46 In the case of Hungary within the EU, all three of these conditions are true.47 
Aligning with this, Magyar asserts in his book on illiberalism in Hungary that domestic resources 
in Hungary are insufficient for the ruling regime’s needs, and that “paradoxically, the freedom 
allowing the enrichment of the adopted political family is mainly fueled by European Union 
funding, ranging from the agricultural single area payment scheme to large infrastructural 
developments.”48 If this is the case, then it is possible that EU funding is enabling the illiberal 
practices of the FIDESZ government. Whereas the intuitive logic is that Hungary’s economic 
dependence on EU transfers should exist as incentive to adhere to EU norms and values, this 
argument contends that EU transfers enable illiberalism in Hungary. Of course, the existence of 
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an option doesn’t necessitate that it will or should be pursued, and to do so in this particular 
situation would be slightly Judas-like.  
Orbán Leadership in Hungary 
 Although there exist shortcomings at the EU level regarding monitoring and enforcement 
of normative values like democracy and rule of law, questionable assumptions in the ideas 
driving political and economic transformations during Hungary’s transition leading up to EU 
accession, and asymmetrical fiscal transfers’ potential to enable illiberalism at the state level, 
none of these are motivating factors for a turn to illiberalism. Capacitation is not causation. In 
considering the influence that economic sanctions may have on illiberalism in Hungary, it is 
important to consider the motivations for the illiberal turn. Before moving to this, also important 
to note is that Victor Orbán is an experienced actor with a long history in politics. Actor-centered 
theories of international relations have identified that ‘novice’ actors tend to be more receptive to 
outside pressure. With Orbán, who has had a long-standing history as party leader and was 
previously prime minister49 from 1998 to 2002 before his current post beginning in 2010, one 
should not expect this to be the case.  
 The democratic backsliding in Hungary occurring in tandem with Orbán’s eastern-facing 
economic liberalization policies of Global Opening and public statements commending 
governance in illiberal regimes like Russia has led to speculation that Orbán’s turn toward 
illiberal governing practices is the result of successful norms diffusion from Moscow, with some 
calling Budapest Putin’s ‘Trojan horse’ in the EU. However, a closer look reveals that this may 
not be the case. Orbán entered the larger political stage in 1989 with a bold, televised speech at 
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the reburial of Imre Nagy, Hungarian prime minister during the failed 1956 revolution, where he 
voiced distinctly anti-Soviet sentiments and called for the immediate removal of Soviet troops 
from Hungary. His following years in Hungarian politics were branded with a harshly anti-
Russian stance, including during his first term as Hungarian prime minister and through the 
2000s. The accommodative turn in his attitude toward Russia began shortly leading up to his 
election in 2010, and has continued through his current tenure in office.50 On the other side, 
Putin has not demonstrated consistent support of the Orbán regime. In 2015, when the European 
Commission began investigations on an energy deal in Hungary regarding a Russian-built 
nuclear plant, Putin swiftly threatened Hungary for not pulling out of the agreement. In 2014, 
Russia’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement accusing the Hungarian government of selling 
tanks to Ukraine via third party, and furthermore published details online which gave the 
Hungarian press access to information that was otherwise previously denied to them. Most 
clearly, press reports demonstrate that the Kremlin is involved in funding FIDEZS’ main 
domestic political competition party, Jobbik.51 Between Orbán’s history of anti-Russia ideas, 
Russia’s open statements against Hungary, and the Kremlin’s funding of Orbán’s political rivals, 
it does not appear as though the recent cooperation between Budapest and Moscow are 
politically or ideologically driven. Instead, the thin partnership may perhaps be explained 
through mutually beneficial economic interests.  
 On the one hand, Hungary’s economic opening toward the East can be temporally aligned 
with Orbán coming to office in 2010. At the same time, 2010 was a period of economic 
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instability in Hungary, Europe, and the rest of the world. Orbán’s return to prime minister office 
in 2010 was won on a platform of, among other promises, national sovereignty and state-led 
economic nationalism, the latter of which was supposed to (as declared by Orbán:) “build a 
country in which foreign banks and bureaucrats are not telling us what to do.”52 These ideas 
resonated especially well in the context of socially devastating austerity measures imposed by 
European institutions and the IMF on struggling Eurozone economies. While Orbán’s statist 
political policies can be interpreted as a turn toward illiberal values, statist developments in the 
economic realm and economic opening toward the East may be driven largely by a motivation to 
improve Hungarian national sovereignty through economic strength. On launching his “Global 
Opening” trade policy, Orbán asserted:  
We are convinced that, during the next decade, it is one’s economic position that will 
constitute one’s most important international or political bargaining power. [That position 
will not be] of a military, of a religious, or of an ideological nature, but of a 
fundamentally economic nature”.53  
It may make sense for Orban’s motivations to be primarily economic for two main reasons. The 
first being his belief, that has also been voiced in many recent analyses, that the strength of the 
global economy is making a shift toward the East. This is reflected in his quote that “while we 
sail under a Western flag, it is an Eastern wind that blows in the global economy.54 In this 
context, the Eastward turn is reflective of economically-driven shift toward rising economic 
powers. The second is that Orbán recognizes Hungary’s economic dependence on Russia, 
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especially in the energy sector. EU dependence on Russian energy is well documented, and 
Hungary’s case is even more dire with its “triple energy dependence” on Russia for oil, gas, and 
nuclear energy. Although Hungary has supported all pipeline projects that may increase energy 
diversification, as well as made a recent shift away from hydrocarbon resource consumption, it 
remains heavily dependent on Russia for energy resources.55 Another one of Orbán’s campaign 
promises was to keep household energy costs low, keeping this promise may be another reason 
for economic cooperation with Russia.  
 Overall, it appears as though Orbán’s cooperation with Russia is not ideologically driven, 
but rather driven by economic interests. Political alignment with Russian practices may, 
similarly, be occurring not through mechanisms of norm diffusion from Russia, but rather 
coincidentally aligned (or in some cases perhaps borrowed, but driven by domestically-sourced 
interests) practices that result from internal preferences. However, it does create some barriers to 
the capacity that sanctions may be effective in Hungary because it opens the availability of 
significant alternative revenue streams from Russia and strong economies in the East like China. 
In fact, Hungary is already currently the largest recipient in CEE for Chinese FDI flows. Second, 
economic strength through eastern economic cooperation increase Orbán’s ability to maintain his 
campaign promises and provide welfare for the domestic populace, solidifying domestic public 
support. Other actions that Orbán has taken decrease the potential success of economic sanctions 
against him is that although it has been largely acknowledged that there has been a dismantling 
of democratic checks in balances in Hungary since he came to power. Among these actions are 
that Orbán has been very careful to maintain technical compliance with EU law, which makes it 
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difficult for the EU to mobilize action against him. Furthermore, the undermining of liberal 
democratic institutions like manipulating the domestic voting structure, compromising the 
impartiality of the courts, and gaining significant control over the voice of the media, all increase 


























CHAPTER 5: EU SANCTIONS, POLICY, AND HUNGARY 
Introduction 
 As established earlier in my paper, economic sanctions are not generally considered a 
particularly successful policy tool, especially when their goal is to democratize target states. If 
this is the case, the question is raised as to why the EU, and sender states in general, continue to 
use them. The answer may be that economic sanctions can be seen as a clear response, action 
‘between words and war.’ This is particularly relevant when sender states are pressured with 
domestic calls for action against events in potential target states, especially if the pressure is 
coming from interest groups that may impact their prospects for reelection. There are clear 
indicators that the EU pursues sanctions with the motivation of acquiescing domestic publics.  
EU Sanctions as Foreign Policy 
 The EU has a limited foreign policy toolbox, and its main ‘hard power’ mechanism for 
coercion lies in its economic leverage. However, being limited to a single active foreign policy 
tool may potentially lead to its overuse. The EU may be described as rather ‘trigger-happy’ when 
it comes to the use of economic sanctions; the European Parliament has discussed imposing 
sanctions on 40 percent of the world’s states.56 The predominant appeal of sanctions, not just for 
the EU, lie in that they are a relatively easy way to appear as though sender states are ‘doing 
something.’ Sanctions have been called “the lazy man’s foreign policy”57 that is much easier to 
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enact than foreign policy options like military intervention, while resonating well with the voting 
population. When words aren’t enough, imposing economic sanctions are the EU’s way to 
demonstrate itself as more than just a passive actor. As one official has put it, the EU’s approach 
is: “I sanction, therefore I am.”58  
EU need for active foreign policy tools yet lack thereof outside of economic sanctions 
may lead to the use of sanctions in situations where it is not necessarily a relevant option in 
creating the desired change. Studies that include interviews with EU officials suggest that the EU 
not only uses sanctions in cases where there is a lack of clearly identified causal links between 
economic sanctions and the desired policy outcomes, but also that EU policymakers may not be 
particularly interested in whether the sanctions they impose will successfully result in the stated 
policy goals. Jones quotes Eriksson’s study of EU policymaking, where interviews with officials 
revealed a “breathtaking ‘lack of knowledge about how sanctions are meant to work’ and a total 
absence of strategic evaluation.”59 In support of this argument, the EU does not have a 
mechanism with which to evaluate targeted sanctions. Once sanctions have been imposed, what 
happens next in target countries does not appear to be closely followed. An example of this can 
be found in a case of EU sanctions on Zimbabwe for human rights abuses: 
An official familiar with Zimbabwe commented that they were never consulted when EU 
sanctions there were up for renewal. Ministers were disinterested in their domestic impact 
in Zimbabwe because their main priority was to persuade their European counterparts to 
maintain sanctions in order to continue appeasing domestic liberals opposed to the 
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Mugabe government. As the official commented: ‘the ostensible target is not the real 
target’.60 
These interactions with policymakers and case example indicate a possibility that EU sanctions 
policy is driven by appeasing domestic pressures for action rather than effectively promoting 
policy goals in target states. Sanctions, by definition, create costs in the countries that they target, 
often manifesting in civilian suffering. If it is the case that the EU is using sanctions purely to 
send messages to domestic populations or international actors outside of the state being targeted 
by a particular sanctions policy, then a question of ethical appropriateness is raised.  
EU Interests Regarding Democratic Backsliding in Hungary 
 The EU, having stated vested interests in values like human dignity, equality, and human 
rights, should be expected, in any case, to pursue sanctions that are expected to succeed in 
achieving their stated goal(s). In the case where the target state is Hungary, the EU has even 
further incentives to ensure that any economic sanctions employed are only done so in a way that 
target specific policies and/or actors and expect a high probability of success. First, that Hungary 
is an EU member state makes its ideological heterogeneity a potential threat to EU stability and 
the political future of the EU project. Second, the geopolitical relevance of Hungary poses 
potential concern from an EU perspective for a security risk. Third, effectively addressing the 
democratic backsliding in Hungary may also temper the recent rise of right-wing, populist, 
nationalist parties that has been occurring across the EU. Fourth, although Hungary is more 
economically dependent on the EU than vice versa, trade integration between the two and 
investment flows into Hungary from other EU member states mean that the EU would also feel a 
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negative impact from losing Hungary as an economic partner, especially in the prolific backward 
supply chains between Hungary and Western Europe respectively. 
Given EU interests riding on successful outcomes of economic sanctions, the EU should 
be extremely careful in the design of any economic sanctions employed. There are many policy 
outcomes that could result from EU economic sanctions on Hungary, and most of them would 
place Hungary further from EU norms regarding democracy and rule of law than the current 
situation. EU economic sanctions on Hungary could, reasonably, 1) strengthen Orbán and the 
FIDESZ party’s power in Hungarian government. As discussed, sanctions provide a potential 
focal point for blame shifting, and, especially in the hands of an experienced political actor like 
Orbán, can be leveraged to produce a ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect. 2) weaken Orbán and 
FIDESZ to an extent that they stay in power but are more open to negotiating with the EU and 
make policy concessions. It seems unlikely that Orbán would do this, and furthermore, if he 
would, this option would hypothetically exist only on an extremely thin line between options one 
and three. 3) weaken Orbán and FIDESZ to an extent that they are unable to win reelection and 
are replaced by their political competitor, the next largest party, Jobbik. This would likely place 
Hungary further from the EU’s stated goals, as Jobbik is an actively pro-Russia party funded by 
the Kremlin. Béla Kovács, a member of European Parliament affiliated with the Jobbik party, is 
currently being investigated by EU authorities on charges of Russian espionage.61 4) weaken 
Orbán and FIDESZ to an extent that they are unable to win reelection and are replaced by their 
political competitor, who is ideologically closer to EU norms and values. This seems fairly 
unlikely because a) sanctions, in the past, have not been able to generate new parties or 
sufficiently empower weak parties, b) Orbán’s undermining of liberal democracy included 
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limiting the campaign funding in a way that severely restricted the material resources of weaker 
parties, c) it is illegal for EU-level political parties or party foundations to fund national parties, 
4) Orbán currently has high public approval ratings, dramatic domestic change in voting 
preferences seems unlikely. FIDESZ and Jobbik currently dominate Hungarian politics, and it 
seems unlikely that a small, pro-EU party aligned with EU norms and values would be elected. 
5) sanctions are lifted despite lack of success. This could be leveraged by Orbán to give 
legitimacy to his illiberal practices, since the lifting of sanctions should only occur when goals 
have been met. Alternatively, if the EU openly declares that sanctions are lifted despite failure, it 
may delegitimize the EU. 
Remarks on EU Use of Economic Sanctions in Hungary 
Of these options, only two results place Hungary in closer alignment with EU goals than 
the current situation. Of these two results, neither seem at all likely. Given these prospects, my 
recommendation would be for the EU not to pursue economic sanctions on Hungary with the 
goal of promoting liberal democracy. However, avoiding stubborn naïveté that ignores the EU’s 
need to take action, I recommend that if the EU does impose such sanctions, they do so under the 
following conditions:  
1. Apply economic sanctions alongside other foreign policy tools like diplomatic 
sanctions. Perhaps due to partisan politics, key EU heads of state have refrained 
from criticizing the FIDESZ government. Sequentially, especially in this case, EU 
actors should attempt other foreign policy tools before economic sanctions.  
2. Attempt to negotiate multilateral sanctions. Perhaps still unrealistic, but sanctions 
on Hungary will be significantly more likely to succeed if EU sanctions are 
supported by sanctions from major potential alternative revenue streams.  
 35 
3. Research the situation, and design the sanctions based on this. 
4. Put in place an exit strategy. Sanctions are, generally, more difficult to lift than 
they are to enact. Especially in a body like the EU where it may sometimes be 
difficult to reach consensuses, mechanisms for reducing/lifting sanctions are 
advisable. 
5. Build in an ‘emergency brake.’ In a policy brief out of the Brookings Institution 
regarding US sanctions policy, Haass highlights the importance of a ‘waiver 
authority’ that allows the President to suspend/terminate a sanction.62 The idea 
being that relationships should not become hostage to a single interest. Especially 
regarding EU sanctions on a member state, building in potential for flexibility is 
advisable. 
The EU is currently exploring the option of attaching conditionality to the EU budget, that is, 
making the distribution of EU funds available only to member states that maintain convergence 
with EU norms on liberal democracy and rule of law. My greatest criticism with the proposals 
thus far is regarding paragraph four under section three of the explanatory memorandum 
prepared by the European Commission. The paragraph is regarding impact assessment of the 
proposal, and is as follows: 
No impact assessment has been carried out as the measure has as its sole objective to 
avoid that the Union budget is harmed by situations where a generalised deficiency as 
regards the rule of law in a Member State affects or risks affecting the sound financial 
management and the protection of the financial interests of the Union. The options were 
therefore to either maintain the status quo, with no specific financial procedure in case of 
                                                      
62 Haass, “Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing.” 
 36 
problems relating to the rule of law and potentially affecting the sound management of 
Union funds, or to develop such a procedure.63 
It is important that the EU take action regarding alleged misappropriation of its funds. It would 
be nefarious for a member state to receive and spend large amounts of EU funding while 
simultaneously flagrantly violating fundamental EU values and principles. At the same time, 
economic sanctions are form of intervention and should not be used without, at a minimum, an 
assessment of the potential impact. Restricting aid and/or financing falls within the definition of 
economic sanctions.  To frame the withholding of EU funds solely as a necessary measure to 
protect EU budget is outlandishly reductionist, at best. Complete, deliberate ignorance of the 
potential impact of economic sanctions is not advisable in any case. It raises general ethical 
concerns given the resulting costs that may be, and often are, diverted to innocent citizens that 
are neither responsible for the offending behavior that stimulated the enactment of sanctions, nor 
capable of effectively influencing policy change toward the goals of sanctions regimes. Also, it 
almost certainly sets up a situation where the economic sanctions will fail in achieving the stated 
goal, especially when the goal is democratization. In this case, the goal is rule of law, which 
theoretically will almost certainly encounter many of the same barriers outlined in section two of 
this paper for why economic sanctions rarely succeed in effecting democratic change. Especially 
given that this mechanism is designed for use within its own member states, the EU should be 
interested in the success of potential economic sanctions. One-size-fits-all approaches to 
economic sanctions are very nearly guaranteed to fail. If brought into effect, it may be expected 
that the mechanism will be enacted on Hungary. In the case of Hungary, it is logically 
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inconceivable that a blanket sanction with a vaguely defined goal based on a foundation of due 
diligence lacking in any impact assessment will succeed. Not only is such an economic sanctions 
policy on Hungary highly unlikely to succeed in achieving the EU’s stated criteria for reducing 
or lifting the sanctions, may potentially influence change the opposite direction.  
 It is certainly within EU interests to protect and assure the sound management of EU 
funds. In the case that this implies economic sanctions on the current situation in Hungary, the 
magnitude and likelihood of results that would place Hungary even further than it currently 
stands relative to EU norms on rule of law should make it unadvisable for the EU to apply a one-
size-fits-all policy to a complex situation in a region so critically embedded in the political and 
economic interests for the future of the EU. The EU should remember past experiences wherein 
implementing policies without accounting for the potential negative consequences resulted in 
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